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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. ("U.C.A.") § 78-2-2 (3) (ii) (2002) grants the Utah Supreme Court 
original appellate jurisdiction over final formal agency decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. Under U.C. A. § 78-2-2 (4) the Utah Supreme Court may, at its discretion, 
transfer a case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY 
DETERMINE THAT BRADLEY SCOTT'S PRIMARY 
RESIDENCE FOR THE 2001 TAX YEAR WAS HIS HOME 
IN PARK CITY? 
This issue was preserved below by the body of arguments made at hearing (R. 00152-
190) and by the Tax Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision 
(County Brief Add. E) 
Standard of Review: The determination of the issue before the Court is a question of 
fact. On review, the Court grants deference to the Tax Commission's written findings of fact, 
,ipplyiii!! a substantial evidence standard. U.C.A. § 59-1-610 (a) (2002). The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that in "reviewing questions of fact, we defer to a great degree to the 
Commission's findings and reverse only where they are without foundation in the evidence." 
State (Tax Com'n) v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051,1053 (Utah 1984). The Utah 
Courts have also held specifically "that the Tax Commission's determination of domicile 
involves a question of fact, reviewing such determination under a 'substantial evidence' 
standard of review." Orton v. Utah State Tax Com'n. Collection Div.. 864 P.2d 904, 907 
(Utah App. 1993) (citing O'Rourke v. Utah StateTax Commission. 830 P.2d 230, 232 (Utah 
1992)). See also Allen v. Greyhound Lines. Inc.. 583 P.2d 613, 614 (Utah 1978) (stating the 
1 
"sole issue presented for the trial judge's determination was one of fact, viz., the place of 
plaintiffs domicile.") 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Traveler/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 221, f 
13, 51 P.3d 1288, quoted Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1931 (1986) for the 
synonymous use of the terms residency and domicile in the definition of "reside" and 
"residing." The Court noted that "cases have either distinguished between 'domicile' and 
'residence' or used them interchangeably." Id. at n. 4 (citing Frame v. Residency Appeals 
Comm. Of Utah State Univ., 675 P.2d 1157, 1159 n. 1 (Utah 1983)). 
Where courts have made a distinction "domicile is presumed to follow residency." 
Allen, 583 P.2d at 615. In Clements v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, Collection Div., 893 P.2d 
1078 (Utah App. 1995) the Court of Appeals explained that "domicile will be found where 
there is a residence coupled with an intent to remain for an indefinite period." Id. at 1081 
(citing Gardner v.Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 222 P.2d 1055,1057 (Utah 1950)). 
Therefore, domicile and residency are either used synonymously and residence like 
domicile is a factual determination, or the factual determination of domicile is based upon a 
factual finding of residency plus a factual finding of intent to remain. In either case it can be 
fairly said that "the Tax Commission's determination of [residency] involves a question of 
fact," and the Court examines "such determination under a 'substantial evidence' standard of 
review." See Orton, 864 P.2d at 907. 
II. CAN A HUSBAND AND WIFE HAVE SEPARATE DOMICILES AND 
THEREFORE CONSTITUTE TWO HOUSEHOLDS WITH SEPARATE 
RESIDENCES FOR TAX PURPOSES AND IF SO WERE JULIAN SCOTT 
AND THE SCOTT CHILDREN DOMICILED IN SALT LAKE? 
2 
The permissibility of duel residences for husband and wife is a legal determination 
which ti rj i .^ nrt reviews i indei acoi i ection of ei i < »i «i w idai ci, granting no deference to tl le 
decision of the Tax Commission. U.C.A. § 59-1 ~h I o Whether Julian Scott and the children 
were domiciled at the Salt Lake home during the _uu; tax year is a factual determination as 
described above. 
There is, however, no final judgment or order as to those issues for the Court to 
i eview, since the Tax Commission did not reach the Issn le of duel residency and declin sd tc 
make a determinative finding as to the residence of Julian Scott and the children. Appellee 
therefore argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to J- • •• -^ issues. 
The question of Julian Scott and the Scott children's domicile was preserved below at 
hearing and in the Tax Commission's decision. The issue of duel residency was preserved in 
the Hearing (R 001 54) and in 1 ax Commission Finding of Fact # 9. (County Brief Add. E. at 
p. 30 
S i A 1 £ M E N T Q F T H E C A s £ 
Bradley and his wife Julian Scott own two residential homes, one purchased in 1989 
and located in Park City, I J tali, and the other pin chased in I  999 and located in Salt I ake City, 
Utah. Mrs. Scott and the Scott's four children established residence in the Park City home in 
1997. Mr. Scott followed in 1998. I he Scott family purchased the Salt Lake home to 
accommodate the children's schooling at Rowland Hall in Salt Lake City. Mrs. Scott and 
children spend four nights a week at the Salt Lake home, where Mr. Scott joins them 
approximate^ tw o nights aw eek I he family spends the balance of their time at the Park 
City home. Mr. Scott, is an active member of the Park City community, even to the extent of 
declaring his candidacy foi Mayor in spring of 2001 
3 
Both homes received tax exemptions as primary residences in the 2000 tax year. In 
the 2001 tax year Summit County reclassified the Park City home as a secondary residence 
and removed the tax exemption. Mr. Scott appealed the reclassification to the Summit 
County Board of Equalization, which upheld the determination of the Summit County 
Assessor. 
Mr. Scott then appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission. The Commission 
reversed the decision of the Summit County Board of Equalization, finding that the Park City 
home was Mr. Scott's primary residence. The Tax Commission did not reach the issue of two 
primary residences, but found based on the limited evidence for the residence of Mrs. Scott 
and the children that it was possible their primary residence was also Park City. < 
The Summit County Board of Equalization filed its appeal from the decision of the 
Tax Commission with the Utah Supreme Court on June 20, 2003. On August 1, 2003, the 
i 
Utah Court Supreme Court issued an order assigning this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The subject residential property (the "Park City home") is located in Park City at i 
8200 Royal Street, which is in the Stag Lodge development at Deer Valley. 
2. At issue is whether the Park City home qualifies for the 45% primary residential 
exemption from property taxes for the 2001 tax year. 
3. Bradley and Julian Scott have owned the Park City home since 1989. Prior to the 
summer of 1997, the Scott family lived in California and used the subject property 
i 
as a vacation home. 
4. In the summer of 1997, Ms. Scott and the four children moved from California and 
established their residence at the Park City home. Mr. Scott remained in | 
4 
California until late 1998 to attend to business affairs, at which time he also moved 
to Utah and established his residence in Park City. 
5. In the autumn of 1997, the Scott children were enrolled at Rowland Hall, a private 
school located in Salt Lake City. For over a year, the children commuted to school 
from the subject property in Park City. 
6. In the spring of 1999, the Scotts purchased another home, located at 1101 N. Oak 
Forest Road in Salt Lake City (the "Salt Lake home"). This home was purchased 
to accommodate the children's schooling and social activities, and to eliminate the 
burden of the commute. 
7. The family calls the Salt Lake home the "school home" and the entire family stays 
at the Park City home on weekends and during school vacations. 
8. When school is in session Mrs. Scott and the children generally spend four nights 
and week at the Salt Lake home and the remaining three nights at the Park City 
home. 
9. Mr. Scott typically spends five nights a week at the Park City home and two nights 
a week in Salt Lake. 
10. The Park City home and the Salt Lake home are similar in size, are both fully 
furnished and received relatively similar assessments for the 2001 tax year. 
11. Both homes received the primary residential exemption for the 2000 tax year. 
The Summit County and Salt Lake County assessors discussed the issue of 
residential exemption and the Salt Lake County assessor decided that the Salt Lake 
home qualified for the exemption. As a result, the Summit County assessor 
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removed the primary residential exemption from the Park City home. The Summit 
County Board of Equalization sustained the assessor's action. 
12. Mr. Scott appealed Summit County's action and asked the Tax Commission to 
reinstate the primary residential exemption on the Park City home. 
13. Both Bradley and Julian Scott listed the Park City home as their home address and 
mailing address on their 2001 Federal Income Tax Return and their 2001 Utah 
Individual Income Tax Return, both filed jointly. 
14. The 2001 Park City telephone directory listed "Bradley Scott" at the address of the 
Park City home. Mr. Scott's only Salt Lake listing was for his office at 9 
Exchange Place. No listing could be found for the Salt Lake home. 
15. Mr. Scott's Utah driver's license, issued early in 1999, lists the Park City home as 
his address, as does his Park City library card. 
16. Mr. Scott was president of the Stag Lodge Owners Association, where the Park 
City home is located, in 2001. In 2001 he was also a member of the Board of 
Trustees of the Summit Institute for the Arts. 
17. Mr. Scott was not a member or sponsor of any organization in Salt Lake City in 
2001. 
18. The Scott family's church records are located at the Park City ward of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. The most recent baptism of one of the Scott 
children occurred at the Park City ward. 
19. None of the Scott children attend public school. They attend private school and 
participate in extra-curricular activities in Salt Lake City. 
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20. Mr. Scott announced as a candidate for mayor of Park City in March or April of 
2001. After preparing campaign literature he withdrew his candidacy when his 
voting in Salt Lake City in the 2000 general election became an issue. 
21. Mr. Scott was registered to vote in Salt Lake City because the voter registration 
form required a physical mailing address and specifically instructed the registrant 
not to list a post office box. Because mail was delivered to a Park City post office 
box rather than to the Stag Lodge homes Mr. Scott entered the address of the Salt 
Lake home—his only physical residence mailing address. This resulted in Mr. 
Scott's registration in Salt Lake City, even though he listed Park City as his home 
address. Mr. Scott voted in Salt Lake City in the 2000 general election and has not 
changed his voter registration. 
22. Since summer of 1999 Mr. Scott has maintained an office at 9 Exchange Place in 
Salt Lake City, for the monitoring of his investments. Mr. Scott is retired and does 
not operate any business from this office. 
23. Mr. Scott chose this location partly because a Park City friend is the owner of the 
building and Mr. Scott was able to lunch with and commute with his friend. 
24. Mr. Scott's controller is located at the Exchange Place office, where bills and other 
mail are delivered. All mail goes to that location with the exception of cards and 
letters addressed to the Salt Lake home. 
25. In 1997 Mr. Scott opened a bank account at the Park City branch of Wells Fargo 
and established a banking relationship with private client services representative 
DarrinBurg. 
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26. When the Park City branch closed in 1999 and Mr. Burg was transferred to a Salt 
Lake City office Mr. Scott maintained the relationship with Mr. Burg and 
transferred his account to Salt Lake. 
27. The Scott family owns or leases a number of motor vehicles, none of which are 
registered at the Salt Lake home. 
28. 2001 vehicle registration forms submitted by Mr. Scott show that the vehicles 
registered at the Park City home in 2001 included a Toyota 4Runner, a Dodge 
Truck, a Mercedes Benz, a boat and trailer. An Audi, a BMW, a Ferrari and a 
Bentley were registered at the 9 Exchange Place office. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should dismiss this appeal on the basis that Summit County fails to address 
the only issue validly before Court and invalidly attempts to argue an issue upon which there 
is no final judgment or order and that the County lacks standing to raise. 
The Tax Commission's only finding was that the primary residence of Bradley Scott 
in the 2001 tax year was at the family's home in Park City, and that, based on limited 
evidence, this was possibly also the primary residence of Mrs. Scott and the Scott children. 
The County has not challenged this finding, which is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 
The Tax Commission did not address the issue of duel primary residences. Therefore, 
this issue is not part of the "judgment or order" from which the County appeals and is not 
before the Court. Furthermore, the County lacks standing to raise that issue. The Park City 
home has been established without challenge as the primary residence. Therefore, an actual 
controversy over duel residency rests solely upon the status of the Scott's Salt Lake home, 
8 
which falls within the jurisdiction of Salt Lake County, not Summit County. Moreover, the 
tax classification of the Park City home is not contingent upon either the tax classification of 
the Salt Lake home or the permissibility of duel primary residences. Consequently, neither of 
these issues impact Summit County's tax revenues, leaving the County without a stake in 
these issues. However, because the County has argued the issue of duel residency, Appellee 
argues in the alternative that under appropriate circumstances closely associated persons may 
establish separate domiciles, thus constituting multiple households each entitled to the 
primary residential tax exemption. Because Julian Scott and the Scott children have 
established a domicile at the Salt Lake house the Scott family constitutes two households for 
property tax purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL BECAUSE APPELLANT 
HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE ONLY ISSUE DECIDED BY THE TAX 
COMMISSION. 
A. The Issue of Bradley Scott's Primary Residence in the 2001 Tax Year is the 
Only Question Decided by the Tax Commission. 
The County states that the "Utah State Tax Commission (the "commission") 
determined that the Scotts were entitled to two primary residential property tax exemptions, 
one in Park City and the other in Salt Lake City." (County Brief p. 7.) The County is 
incorrect. The Commission, in fact, made no determination of duel residency. To the 
contrary, it stated that "[t]he primary residential exemption of the Park City home is the only 
issue in this matter," (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("FFCLFD") 
County Brief Add. E p. 13), and "[a]t issue in this case is whether the Petitioners are entitled 
to receive the primary residential exemption on the subject property." (FFCLFD, Applicable 
Law # 1, County Brief Add. E p. 7.) 
9 
B. The County Has Not Challenged the Tax Commission's Determination that the 
Park City Home Was Bradley Scott's Primary Residence in 2001, and Has 
Failed to Marshal and Discount the Evidence Supporting that Determination. 
The County's Brief contains no challenge to the only determination made by the Tax 
Commission, its finding that for purposes of U. C. A. 59-2-103 (2), providing a property tax 
exemption for property used as a primary residence, the Scott's Park City home was the 
primary residence of Bradley Scott for the 2001 tax year. Rather, the County spends both its 
issue statement and argument entirely on the question of duel residency, which the Tax 
Commission did not reach. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 (a) provides for "Appeal from a Final Judgment 
or Order," and requires that a notice of appeal be filed "within 30 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from" (Emphasis added.) The requirement for a final 
judgment or order has been met in the instant case as to the issue of the primary residence of 
Bradley Scott. It is also necessary, however, that the appellant challenge, or appeal from, that 
final judgment or order. An appellant has no latitude to either neglect to make such a 
challenge, or to invent an order of its own choosing and then rush off tilting after that 
windmill. Appellant here has done both. 
Rule 24 (a) (9) presupposes a challenge to the actual judgment or order when it 
specifies in relevant part that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." As established above under Standard of 
Review, the Tax Commission's determination of residency is a question of fact. It is 
uncontested that the facts enumerated in the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact are 
supported by evidence in the record and themselves constitute the evidentiary support for the 
Tax Commission's finding that Bradley Scott's primary residence during the 2001 tax year 
10 
was located at the Park City home, situated in Summit County. Appellee refers the Court to 
the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact and to the Facts section above, incorporated here by 
reference. The Tax Commission's determination, based on this evidence, that the Park City 
was Mr. Scott's primary residence, rests upon a solid foundation in the record. The County 
has made no attempt to marshal, or even acknowledge, these facts and has neither challenged 
the Commission's finding of primary residency nor attacked the substantiality of the 
supporting evidence. 
II. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF DUEL 
RESIDENCY BECAUSE THAT QUESTION WAS NOT PART OF THE 
TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION 
Finding # 9 notes that "[Bradley Scott] asks the Tax Commission to either find that he 
and his family have two 'households'... or find that the family constitutes one 'household' 
that is domiciled at the park City Subject property." (County Brief Add. E p. 3.) The Tax 
Commission chose the latter alternative and made a positive determination that the Park City 
home was the primary residence of Bradley Scott. The Commission declined to definitively 
adjudicate the question of "households" and the residence of Julian Scott and the children on 
the basis of insufficient evidence, stating that "[f]rom the limited information provided about 
Mrs. Scott and the Scott children, it is possible that their domicile was also at the Park City 
subject property as of the lien date." ( County Brief Add. E p. 13 (emphasis added).) Thus, 
the Tax Commission did not adjudicate the issue of duel residency and therefore the duel 
residency question is not part of the final decision or order from which appeal can be taken. 
Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide that issue. The decision addressed by this 
appeal is confined to the factual determination of Bradley Scott's primary residence, which is 
supported by substantial evidence and which the County failed to challenge. 
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III. THE COUNTY LACKS STANDING TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF DUEL 
PRIMARY RESIDENCY 
A. The Duel Residency Question Can Be Reached in the Context of an Actual 
Controversy Only Through a Challenge to the Status of the Salt Lake Home. 
The Tax Commission designated the Park City home as Bradley Scott's primary 
residence without regard to the status of the Salt Lake home. The County may attempt to 
argue that authorization of duel residency is implied in the finding that Park City is Bradley 
Scott's primary residence. Such an argument fails in light of the Commission's determination 
that the residence of Mrs. Scott and the family may also be in Park City and the absence from 
the decision of any mention of the Salt Lake home. Thus, the Commission's determination 
that the tax classification of the Park City home is a primary residence stands alone, leaving < 
Salt Lake County free to remove the primary residence classification from the Salt Lake home 
at its own discretion. 
With the Park City home uncontested as the primary residence, only the tax 
classification of the Salt Lake home gives rise to an actual controversy in the question of 
whether one family can constitute two "households" for tax exemption purposes. The issue of * 
duel residency remains merely theoretical until a challenge to the status of the Salt Lake home 
is raised by a party with standing to do so. See Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384 
(Utah 1996) (holding that the Court's jurisdiction rests upon a justiciable controversy); Olson ' 
v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1 (Utah 1986) (appellate "court will not 
issue advisory opinions"); Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216 
I 
(Utah App. 1991) (recognizing the "longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory 
opinions"); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990) (appellate courts 
decide only actual controversies). 4 
12 
B. The County Lacks Standing to Challenge Salt Lake County's Classification of 
the Salt Lake Home and thus Raise the Issue of Duel Residency. 
An action must be brought by a party with a stake in the outcome. In Jenkins v. Swan. 
675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court examined the issue of standing. The 
Court explained that "one who is adversely affected by governmental actions has standing . . . 
. One who is not adversely affected has no standing." Id at 1150. 
Because Park City is the primary residence whether the Scott family has one residence 
or two neither the tax classification of the Salt Lake home nor the determination of the duel 
residency question impacts the tax revenues of Summit County and the County has no stake in 
those issues. Moreover, tax decisions regarding the Salt Lake home are outside of Summit 
County's jurisdiction. As a non-party in interest the County lacks standing to challenge the 
status of the Salt Lake house, or raise the issue of duel residency. Such standing resides only 
in Salt Lake County, Bradley Scott, and the Tax Commission, who are not appellants in this 
case and have not put the status of the Salt Lake home or the issue of duel residential 
exemptions before the Court.1 Thus, the issue of duel residency is not part of this appeal, 
notwithstanding its prominence in the County's brief. 
IV. IF THE COURT FINDS THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION TO ADDRESS 
THE ISSUE OF DUEL PRIMARY RESIDENCES, UNDER THE UNIQUE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE BRADLEY SCOTT AND HIS 
FAMILY CONSTITUTE TWO HOUSEHOLDS EACH OF WHICH IS 
ENTITLED TO THE PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION. 
Appellee vigorously maintains its position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the 
issue of duel residency because the Tax Commission's decision did not address that issue, 
1
 All three of these entities satisfy the Jenkins requirement for an entity with "a greater interest 
in the outcome," here of the duel residency question, "than the plaintiff," thus avoiding the 
necessity for the Court to grant standing on that issue to Summit County. Id. 
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which, additionally, the County lacks standing to raise. Without conceding jurisdiction or 
standing, however, Appellee Bradely Scott argues in the alternative that he and his family 
fulfill the conditions under which one family may legally constitute two households for 
purposes of the primary residential tax exemption. 
A. One Family May Legally Constitute Two Households Under the U.C.A. 59-2-
1202 Definition. 
Section 59-2-1202 (4) defines "household" as "an association of persons who live 
in the same dwelling, sharing its furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses." The 
operative word for the purposes of this appeal is "live." 
The County cites the Tax Commission decision Black v. Board of Equalization, 
Appeal No. 02-0598 (Tax Commission 2001) , in which a cohabiting couple who jointly 
owned property in Salt Lake and Summit counties sought to establish a primary residence in 
each location. The Commission stated that "for Mrs. Black and Mr. Forster to each receive a 
primary residential exemption, they would need to show that they are domiciled at different 
locations and do not comprise a household." (County Brief Add. F. at p. 5.) The Commission 
then concluded that the couple's status as a household was contingent upon the status of their 
respective domiciles, stating "[t]o determine if Ms. Black and Mr. Forster are considered one 
household for purposes of the primary residential exemption, we must first examine each of 
2
 Appellee notes that under U.C.A. § 59-1-502.5 (4) "A record may not be kept of the initial 
hearing and all initial hear proceedings are privileged." Therefore, Appellee argues that Tax 
Commission decisions based on initial hearings, such as Black lack precedential value. 
However, since the County has relied upon one such decision and upon another based on a 
Telephone Settlement Conference, and has reproduced both in its Brief, Appellee, without 
conceding precedential value, responds to the County's arguments, and brings to the Court's 
attention a Tax Commission decision supporting duel households for a married couple. This 
decision is reproduced in redacted form to protect the privacy of the Petitioners as Addendum 
A in Appellee's Brief 
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their domiciles to determine if they have primary residences in separate locations or not." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The Commission first firmly established the Salt Lake property as the fundamental 
primary residence, as it has done with Park City home here. Thus, the Summit County 
property in Black is analogous to the Salt Lake home here, in terms of being the residence of 
uncertain tax classification status. From this point on, however, the instant case and Black are 
distinguishable on the facts. Unlike the Salt Lake home here, the Summit property in Black 
lacked persuasive indication that anyone was actually living there. The Tax Commission 
found that Mr. Forster's allegations that he spent most nights in the Summit County home, his 
Summit County voter registration, his telephone listing at the Summit County address, and his 
payment of the utility bills there were outweighed by the facts that: none of his vehicles were 
registered at the Summit County property; he listed his Salt Lake business as his home 
address on federal and state income tax returns; he received no mail in Summit County; he did 
all of his banking in Salt Lake near his business; he also had a telephone book listing at his 
Salt Lake business address; and even the address on his driver's license was that of the Salt 
Lake business. Particularly pertinent was the Tax Commission's finding that "the Summit 
property is only accessible in winter with snowmobiles,... and that no other home in the 
Canyon Rim Ranch development. . . is used as a primary residence" Id. at 6 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the Summit property was essentially a vacation cabin in the woods rather than 
a year-round home in an established residential neighborhood as is the Salt Lake home in this 
appeal. 
Only after determining domicile did the Tax Commission reach the issue of 
household, stating "[hjaving concluded that Ms. Black and Mr. Forster are both domiciled at 
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the Salt Lake property, it is apparent from the facts and testimony that they are a 
'household'." Id. at 7. Because Ms. Black and Mr. Forster had one domicile the Tax 
Commission classified them as one household. 
The County maintains that the "Commission has misinterpreted the term 'household' 
by confusing it with 'domicile'." The confusion, however, is entirely the County's. The Tax 
Commission examined the indicators of domicile in order to determine that Bradley Scott had 
his residence at the Park City home. It did not reach the issue of household. Because section 
59-2-1201 (4) defines household in terms of domicile the Commission could reach the issue 
of whether the Scott family constituted one or two households only by determining that 
Bradley Scott was domiciled at Park City, which it did, and also determining the domicile of 
Julian Scott and the children, which it declined to do. 
The County quotes an unpublished 1997 Advisory Opinion letter for the proposition 
that if a property owner is a Utah resident with more than one home, neither of which is 
rented or leased to another party as a primary residence, the Commission will assume that the 
owner uses one home as a primary and one as a secondary residence. (County Brief, p. 8.) 
This is a perfectly logical statement but proves nothing since it is couched in the singular. Of 
course one individual property owner can have only one primary residence. The citation 
however, is not helpful because it supplies no information as to several individuals, such as 
the husband, wife, and children before the Court here. 
Finally, the County attempts to rely on Hadley v. County Board of Equalization of 
Washington County, Appeal No. 94-2128 (Tax Commission 1994), a 1994 decision in which 
the Tax Commission denied duel residency to a couple with homes in Salt Lake and St. 
George. There the Commission stated that "Petitioner seeks to divide the primary residential 
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property characteristics between a husband and wife. This practice would allow a husband 
and wife to have separate primary residences and thwart the intent of the statute." (County 
Brief at 8.) Times change, however, as society and finally the law recognize the increasing 
independence of individuals even within intact families. Hadley was superceded in 2002 
when the Tax Commission issued the contrary ruling that a husband and wife spending the 
majority of their time in separate homes were entitled to duel primary residences. In order to 
protect the privacy provided to petitioners under U.C.A. 59-1-502.5 (4) we refer to this 
decision as Couple. (See Add. A., redacted copy of decision.) As in Black the Commission 
first examined domicile in order to determine household. In Couple the Commission stated 
that "for [husband] and [wife] to each receive a primary residential exemption, they would 
need to show that they are domiciled at different locations and do not comprise a household." 
(Add. A at p. 5.) Based on the evidence provided the Commission concluded that "[a]s the 
parties were domiciled at two separate locations on January 1, 2002, the Commission does not 
consider them to be a 'household,' for purposes of the primary residential exemption." The 
Commission further concluded that "[although they routinely visit one another, we do not 
consider persons with separate domiciles to live in the 'same dwelling' and, as a result, they 
do not constitute a single 'household.'" (Add A. at p. 8.) 
In Couple the Commission acknowledged that "[s]ection C. of Rule 52 provides that 
the primary residential exemption is limited to one primary residence per household." 
However, the Commission then definitively stated that it "considers [husband] and [wife] to 
be two households as of the lien date," and that therefore, "the limitation of Section C, which 
applies to a single household, does not apply to Petitioners." (Add. A at p. 8-9) 
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It is very interesting to note the Commission's comment that "[t]his ruling comports 
with the decision in Tax Commission Appeal No. 02-0598 (2002), in which the Commission 
stated that a couple could each receive a primary residential exemption if they showed that 
they were domiciled at different locations and did not comprise a household." Appeal No. 02-
0598 is Black. Therefore, whatever the interpretation imposed upon Black by the County in 
the instant case, the Tax Commission itself intended the Black decision to support the 
possibility of duel residencies under the right circumstances. Although the facts in Black did 
not meet these circumstance the reality is that duel residences for cohabiting and even married 
individuals are sometimes legally permissible. Therefore, if Julian Scott and the four Scott 
children have a different domicile than the Park City home established as the residence of 
Bradley Scott then the Scott family, like the husband and wife in Couple, constitutes two 
households with separate residences each eligible for the primary residential tax exemption. 
B. Julian Scott and the Four Scott Children Have Their Domicile at the Salt Lake 
Home and Therefore the Scott Family Constitutes Two Households Each 
Entitled to the Primary Residential Tax Exemption. 
Section E. of Utah Administrative Rule 884-24-52 ("Rule 52") provides a list 
intended as a guideline in determining domicile, which the Tax Commission set forth under 
Applicable Law (County Brief Add. E. p. 8-9) and is incorporated here by reference. 
Responses to these items as to Julian Scott and the children relative to the Salt Lake home, 
insofar as known, are as follows: 1. Voter registration was in Salt Lake and it is likely that 
Julian Scott voted there; 2. Julian Scott and the children have been in continuous residency 
since 1999, excepting school vacations and holidays; 3. the nature and quality of living 
accommodations in the two homes is comparable; 4. family members present in the Salt Lake 
home are mother and all children with visits from the father; 5. Julian Scott's spouse resides 
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in Park City; 9. Church membership in Park City with other affiliations unknown for Julian 
Scott; 11. the children attend school (private, not public) in Salt Lake, which is also the site of 
their extra-curricular and social activities. Thus, it can be argued that a preponderance of the 
evidence supports the domicile of Julian Scott and the children in the Salt Lake home and the 
Scott family, like the family in Couple, constitutes two households, each entitled to one 
primary residential property tax exemption. 
C. Denying a Designation of Two Households to Closely Associated Individuals 
In Appropriate Circumstances Is Counter to Public Policy and Possibly 
Unconstitutional. 
The County expresses concern that a wholesale grant of primary residence status 
to vacation homes would undercut tax revenues. However a realistic assessment of self 
interest alone should ease this fear. Both Black and Hadley, the very decisions cited by the 
County, illustrate the strict criteria for domicile applied by the Tax Commission before it 
reduces its own income by granting duel primary residency to closely associated individuals. 
The much greater concern is the implication that the act of forming a family through 
marriage or even a long-term cohabitational relationship prevents an individual from 
establishing a residence. Such a policy arguably deprives that individual of the equal 
protection of the law under United States Constitution Amendment XIV and violates uniform 
operation of the laws under Utah Constitution Article I section 24. 
Furthermore, such a policy discriminates against intact families by essentially 
requiring that a husband and wife whose professional, family, or other obligations require 
them to maintain separate residences divorce or separate in order to receive the tax exemption 
designed the ease the burden of residential maintenance. Civilized society's strong public 
policy interest in fostering intact families is supported by almost innumerable studies showing 
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the benefits of such families to both children and adults. Moreover, tax policies have been 
shown to definitively impact family patterns. See Taxing the Family. The Family in America, 
Vol. 18, No. 4, April 2003 (compiling sources). Therefore, it is in the best interest of society 
to recognize separate residences when they do, in fact, exist. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee entreats the Court to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground that the County has failed to challenge the finding of the Tax Commission, and has 
instead attempted to argue an issue that was not adjudicated and that the County lacks 
standing to raise. In so doing the Court should leave undisturbed the Tax Commission's 
factual determination that for the 2001 tax year the primary residence of Bradley Scott was 
located at the home in Park City and should defer the issue of duel residency to the day when 
it is raised by a party with standing conferred by a stake in the outcome. 
If, however, the Court chooses to address the issue of duel primary residency, 
Appellee requests the Court to hold that constitutional, legal, and public policy considerations 
support the designation of a single family as two households in certain circumstances and that 
the Scott family has established two domiciles, thus constituting two households each eligible 
for the primary residential tax exemption. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 2003. 
f<rtr?nc Joseph E. Tesch 
Kraig J. Powell 
Victoria W. Romney 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee Bradley & Julian Scott 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE BRADLEY & JULIAN SCOTT to be sent by regular U.S. mail on this 
day of November, 2003, to: 
Robert W. Adkins, 
Summit County Attorney 
David L. Thomas, 
Chief Civil Deputy 
Jami R. Brackin, 
Deputy County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Attorney General 
Michelle Bush 
Assistant Attorney General 
PO Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0874 
Victoria W. Romney 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
ADDENDUM 
Addendum A 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
jLJILS^LSLi W E J R | 




BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 






Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
Tax Year: 2001 
Judge: Chapman 
Presiding: 
Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: 
For Respondent: Salt Lake County Deputy District Attorney 
ppraiser, Salt Lake Assessor's Office 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Commission for an Initial Hearing, which was held 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-502.5 on November 6, 2002. 
The Petitioners are a married couple who have appealed the 2001 assessment of a 
home i n W H H H H H f vision i n f l H H H J ^ t f f Canyon that sits on a 0.21- acre lot. The home 
was built-in 1999 and is comprised of 1672 square feet on the main floor and 420 square feet in the 
basement. There is also a basement garage in the home that measures 864 square feet. Salt Lake 
County initially assessed the subject as a primary residential property with a fair market value of 
for the 2001 tax year. Petitioners appealed the fair market value of the subject to the 
Respondent, which reduced the fair market value to B H B | However, the Respondent also 
removed the primary residential exemption on the property. Petitioners have appealed the 
Respondent's actions to the Tax Commission, asking that the Commission reinstate the property's 
primary residential exemption and further reduce the fair market value of the property. 
The Respondent asks the Commission to approve its removal of the primary 
residential exemption on the subject and increase the property's fair market value t o ^ ^ ^ H based 
on an appraisal prepared by. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. The first issue in this case is whether the taxpayers are entitled to receive the primary 
residential exemption on the subject property. Under Article XIII, Section 2(8) of the Utah 
• A , 
Constitution, the "Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of not to exceed 
45% of the fair market vatue of residential property as defined by law[.]" The Legislature has 
exercised this power by enacting Utah Code Ann. §59-2-103(2), which requires that the fair market 
value of "residential property" be reduced 45%. 
2. For purposes of the 45% exemption, "residential property" is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §59-2-102(27) as follows: 
*.:, "Residential property," for the pui|)oses of the reductions and adjustments 
under this chapter, means any property used for residential purposes as a 
primary residence. It does not include property used for transient residential 
use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
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" " ^ ^ 3 . Utah Administrative Rule 884-24-52 ("Rule 52") was promulgated to provide 
guidance in administering the 45% residential exemption on primary residences. Pertinent to 
the issue in this case are the following sections of Rule 52: 
A. "Household" is as defined in Section 59-2-1202. 
B. "Primary residence" means the location where domicile has been 
established. 
C. Except as provided in D. . . . , the residential exemption . . . is limited to 
one primary residence per household. 
4. To determine where "domicile has been established" for purposes of Section B., 
Section E. of Rule 52 provides a nonexclusive list of factors that are determinative of 
domicile, which include: 
S 
1. whether or not the individual voted in the place he claims to be 
domiciled; " 
2. the length of any continuous residency in the location $ajmed as 
domicile; * i'"» 
3. the nature and quality of the living accommodations that an individual 
has in the location claimed as domicile as opposed to any other 
location; 
4. the presence of family members in a given location; 
5. the place of residency of the individual's spouse or the state of any 
divorce of the individual and his spouse; 
6. the physical location of the individual's place of business or sources of 
income; 
7. the use of local bank facilities or foreign bank institutions; 
8. the location of registration of vehicles, boats, and RVs; 
9. membership in clubs, churches, and other social organizations; 
10. the addresses used by the individual on such things as: a) telephone 
listings; b) mail; c) state and federal tax returns; d) listings in 
official government publications or other correspondence; e) driver's 
license; f) voter registration; and g) tax rolls; 
11. location of public schools attended by the individual or the individual's 
dependents; 
12. the nature and payment of taxes in other states; 
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13. declarations of the individual: a) communicated to third parties; b) 
contained in deeds; c) contained in insurance policies; d) contained 
in wills; e) contained in letters; f) contained in registers; g) 
contained in mortgages; and h) contained in leases. 
14. the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location; 
15. any failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a 
resident; 
16. the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location; 
17. the acquisition of a new residence in a different location. 
5. Section A. of Rule 52 provides that the definition of "household," as found in 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1202, will also apply to the rule. "Household" is defined in Section 
59-2-1202 as "the association of persons who live in the same dwelling, sharing its ^ 
furnishings, facilities, accommodations, and expenses." 
6. The second issue in this appeal involves the fair market value of the subject property. 
i 
Pertaining to this issue, all tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by 
law. Utah Code Ann. 59-2-103(1). I 
7. Petitioner has the burden to establish that the market value of the subject property is 
other than that as determined by Respondent. Utah Admin. R. R861-1 A-7(G). To prevail in a real . 
property tax dispute, the Petitioner must (1) demonstrate that the County's original assessment 
contained error, and (2) provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis for reducing the 
original valuation to the amount proposed by Petitioner. Nelson V. Bd Of Equalization of Salt Lake 4 




There are two issues that the Commission will address in this appeal. The first issue 
is whether the primary residential exemption should be applied to the subject property. The 
second issue concerns the fair market value of the subject property. 
Primary Residential Exemption. Although the County originally assessed the subject 
property as eligible for the primary residential exemption, Respondent specifically removed 
the exemption when the local board of equalization reviewed the property. At issue is 
whether the Petitioners were entitled to the primary residential exemption on the lien date, 
January 1, 2001. To determine whether the subject property should receive a primary 
residential exemption, we must examine where J H H H H H H H H H B B H f t w e r e 
domiciled on the lien date and determine if they comprise a "household," as defined in 
Section 59-2-1202. If they are both domiciled at the same location and comprise a 
"household," then, subject to Section C. of Rule 52, they may only receive one primary 
residential exemption. Onthgotbftr1ianriJ f < ^ J | H | ^ ^ B B B B B M f c t o each receive 
a primary residentiaLexemption. they would need to show that they are domiciled at different 
locations and do not comprise a household,—. 
Both parties supplied information concerning the Petitioners' places of domicile as of 
the lien date. Petitioners contend that because the subject property was I H f l ^ P ^ r i m a r y 
residence during 2001, they are entitled to the primary residential exemption on the property. 
The Respondent argues that because the couple has another home in Arizona on which they 
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also received a primary residential exemption for 2001, the couple is not entitled to a 
"second" such exemption on the subject property. 
•own both the subject property and a home inj 
Arizona, as well as various rental properties in the Salt Lake area. ftMHHfenoved into the 
subject property upon its completion in June 2000. Prior to that, she had lived for a period of 
time in a rental property that the couple owned in the Salt Lake area. She has worked for 
many years in the Salt Lake area as a nurse and was responsible for administering the 
couples' rental units, which consisted of a 7-plex, a 4-plex, two condos, and a single-family 
residence in the Salt Lake area. Although she routinely visited the Page area to be with her 
husband, she spent approximately 80% of her time in Utah for a period of years prioifo the 
lien date. 
Information provided at the hearing shows that ^ ^BHBMhoIds a Utah nursing 
license with a 2000 effective date and was registered to vote at a district in the Brighton area 
in October 2000. Numerous monthly bills and statements relating to the subject property 
were sent to ^ftttt alone or t o ^ ( B H B ^ n c f l f l | H H B M i together at the address of 
the subject property in Brighton on and around the lien date and since on a continuing basis. 
There is a telephone at the subject property with I M M I s name listed in the telephone 
directory. JMf lHD^doc to rs have been located in Utah for years and she has worked 
continually in Utah, although sometimes on a part-time basis, since the late 1980's. 
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Fn once worked in Arizona for two years (from 1994 through 1996), after 
which she let her Arizona nursing license expire. During this period, she lived in Arizona 
approximately 70% of the time and in Utah the remaining time. For many years, the 
Petitioners have filed their income taxes as Arizona residents. They have filed Utah joint 
returns as Utah non-residents during this period. Also during this period, the couples' 
vehicles were all registered in Arizona. f H I ^ H K 1 explained that this was necessary 
because the couple often switched vehicles when his wife visited him or he visited her. 
VHBi^QBroYe a vehicle registered in Arizona and filed joint income tax*returns 
with her husband as Arizona residents. Nevertheless, when considering the factors or 
evidence determinative of domicile in Section E. of Rule 52, the majority of the information 
provided at the Initial Hearing indicates that flflHHfewas domiciled in Utah prior to 
January 1, 2001, the lien date at issue, as well as for the entirety of 2001. 
J H H H H H P v a s employed in Page, Arizona from 1994 until Summer 2002, at 
which time he accepted employment in the Salt Lake area and moved into the subject 
property with his wife. During this period, he lived in the home the couple owned in Page. 
He also he voted in Arizona, filed income tax returns as an Arizona resident, and registered 
his vehicle in Arizona. He claims that once his wife moved to Salt Lake from Arizona in 
1996, he spent 60 to 70% of his time in Arizona, with the other 30 to 40% of his time spent 
in Utah visiting his wife. Although he owned property in Utah during this period with his 
wife, when considering the factors and evidence determinative of domicile in Section E. of 
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Rule 52, there is little question from the information provided at the Initial hearing that 
was domiciled in Arizona prior to the lien date, January 1,2001, and was until his 
return to Utah in 2002. 
Accordingly, as of the lien date at issue, January 1,2001, the Commission considers 
to be domiciled in Utah at the subject property a n ^ | j ^ ^ H | H f l j V to be 
domiciled in Arizona at the home in Page. Asthe parties were domiciled at two separate 
locations on January 1, 200 L the Commission does not consider them to be a "household," 
asjdgfmed in Section A. of Rule 5? and Serrfinn ^9-2-1 ?fl?, n n fhe lien date.. A "household.'^ 
for purposes of the primary residential exemption, is defined as "the association of persons 
who live^jryji£Lsara^ accommodations, and 
ere domiciled in different locations on the lien 
date. Although thev routinely visited one another, we do not consider persons with separate 
domiciles to live in the "same dwelling" and, as a result, they do not constitute a single 
"household," This ruling comports with the decision in Tax Commission Appeal No. 02-
0598 (2002), in which the Commission stated that a couple could each receive a primary 
residential exemption if they showed that they were domiciled at different locations and did 
not comprise a household. 
Section C. of Rule 52 provides that the primary residential exemption is limited to 
one primary residence per household. Respondent argues that because the Petitioners also 
received a 2001 primary residential exemption on their property in Arizona, this limitation 
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•• prevents them receiving the exemption on the subject property. * As discussed above, the 
f t J 
t Commission c o n s i d e r ^ m ^ and V H H H H ^ t o be two households as of the lien 
date. As such, the limitation of Section C, which applies to a single household, does not 
apply to the Petitioners. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to determine if the Petitioners 
received a primary residential exemption on their Arizona property. W/t//K/Kt^ Post~ 
hearing objections to the Arizona primary residential exemption evidence presented by the 
Respondent at the Initial Hearing are disregarded, as this evidence had no bearing on the 
Commission's decision. 
As the subject property was ftp "rip™ipil^lfli^ date at issue, it 
qualifies as a "primary residence," as defined in Section B. of Rule 52, and should receive 
the 45% primary residential exemption for "residential property," as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §59-2-102(27). The limitation of one primary residential exemption per household is 
. _ • • ' " " ' • - " " - — • • ' i 
not relevant under the circumstances present in this appeal. Accordingly, the Commission 
finds that the primary residential exemption should be reinstated on the subject property for 
the 2001 tax year. 
As an aside, in the testimony provided by Petitioners, they indicated that at one point 
their motor vehicles were registered in Arizona, not Utah. With both Petitioners now 
apparently domiciled in Utah, their vehicles should be registered in Utah, in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. §41-1 a-201. Driving without Utah registration after establishing residency 
can result in $1000 minimum fine, as provided for in Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1303(2)(a). 
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Fair Market Value. For the 2001 tax year, the subject property was assessed at 
Included in the documents forwarded from the county hearing were two 
recommendations fron^appraisers from the County assessor's office. One, dated January 3, 
2001 and signed by ( H H B H i l ^ ^ m m e n ^ ^ ^ a t ^ e Respondent (the County BOE) 
sustain the J ^ ^ J ^ i s s e s s c d value for the subject. Another, dated April 4,2002 and signed 
by 9 | | H H | B r e c o m m e n d s that the Respondent reduce the value of the property to 
flBHMI based on appraisals submitted by the Petitioners and the Petitioners' information 
that curing the water problems associated with the subject lot would cost approximately 
• % * 
I H B V . The Respondent reduced the fair market value of the subject property t o V H H H i 
at the county hearing. At the Initial Hearing before the Commission, the Respondent asks 
that the Commission to increase the fair market value of the subj^pt to \ | based on an 
appraisal prepared b ^ B H H B H f o n November 5, 2002. * 
After the hearing, the Petitioners submitted a post-hearing document that included a 
request to place minimum weight on the Respondent's appraisal because the Petitioners did 
not have adequate time to prepare a response to it and because of the Petitioners' perception 
of bias on the part °f flH|H|HB Although we make note of Petitioners' concerns, the 
Commission does not feel the Petitioners are adequately disadvantaged to warrant our 
granting their request. 
Petitioners presented three appraisals concerning the subject property. The first one 
was dated February 28, 2000 and concluded that the value of the subject property would be 
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approximately 0 H H H P upon completion fMMpMP for the "as is" condition prior to 
v completion and a statement that approximatelj^JJPBkvould be required to complete the 
home) (hereinafter referred to as the ^BBBB^appraisal"). A second appraisal dated 
November 19, 2001 concluded th& subject had a value of#BBBBP (the 
appraisal")^ while a-third dated June 6,2002 concluded a value ol^HBHHptlie' 
appraisal"). Ajs stated above, we also received a fourth appraisal from the Respondent, in 
which€IHHHHBHpconcluded the subject had a value o ^ H B P B ^ ( t h e 4 R H H | | 
appraisal"). 
* *When we review the three appraisals submitted by the Petitioners ancl the one 
submitted by the Respondent, it is apparent that the four appraisers have differing opinions 
concerning the subject's value. Two of the appraisers valued the subject a t ^ H B ^ a n d 
<f lMHHl respectively. However, Hie other two appraisers consider the home worth 
considerably more, overUBPBB^Lore. 
Neither of the appraisers who estimated the subject's value a t V H R H ^ a n d 
(JJBBBBPrespectively, supplied any narrative explaining why they chose the comparable 
sales they used. We note that soing of the comparables in these two appraisals were much 
smaller and inferior homes than the subject property. Concerning this point, the appraiser 
who prepared the^(J(BBfappraisal stated in his narrative that the use of such smaller and 
inferior comparables would render the analysis of the subject's value nearly worthless. 
• 1 1 -
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In addition, in t h e ^ H H P appraisal and'the^i^BHI appraisal, the respective 
appraisers used a^P^er square foot adjustment to account for differences in the size of the 
subject and the comparables. On the other hand, in t h e ^ H M appraisal and the! 
appraisal, these appraisers used a^pand#(^pe r square fiSot adjustment,' respectively. 
There are no remarks in the first two appraisals why a^^^djustment was used, but the 
lappraisal included remarks that a higher adjustment per square foot was required in 
"canyon" property because of the greater cost to build. We also note that the first two 
appraisals incorrectly identified the subject as having a two-car garage, while the last two 
appraisals correctly identified it as having a three-car garage. 
For these reasons, the Commission believes that the appraisers who prepared the 
lappraisal and thefB^H^appraisal had a better knowledge of the subject property 
and used more appropriate comparables and adjustments necessary to effectively appraise the 
subject. The€HBB(pappraisal and the€BBPBlappraisal appear to be inferior documents 
and, accordingly, are regarded little weight in our decision. 
When comparing the^((pB^ppraisal and the t H M appraisal, we note that 
each appraisal used the same "comparable number 1," namely a property located atf 
Khat sold in January, 2000. However, we also note that 
m
 thefJ (BH a PP r a i s a l the appraiser lists the sales price of this comparable as t H H V 
and describes the sale as a private sale. On the other hand, in the 4 H H f appraisal, ^fe 
lists the sales price as JjjjHlHand provides a Multiple Listing Service reference 
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number that apparently relaftes to th#sale,. Multiple Listing Service, however, has no record 
of such a reference iiumber. If this comparable is-disregarded because of the sales price 
discrepancy, the remaining two comparable that sold and were used in the j p ^ H k p p r a i s a l 
show adjusted values o f ^ H H ^ p n d j H N r ^ e a ' s o s e e t ' i a t ^ S H H | 1 S remarks m 
this appraisal that the comparable that adjusted to 4 H H H § ' i e best indicator of value for 
the subject property. However, he does not state why he concluded in his appraisal the 
subject to have a fflflflfc value, which is higher than this • H B H K t h e supposed "best > value, which is higher than this 
indicator for the value" of the subject property. 
[appraisal is the best indicator of the For these reasons, we find that the 
f'-" 
• - • •• - i * 
subject property's value from the evidence submitted at the Initial Hearing. However, this is 
a value that does not have any adjustment relating to the^ubject property's water problems 
f 
that were found to exist after the* X [appraisal was completed. In a letteV dated 
| stated the community water system % September 12,2001, to the Respondent,^ 
'Hhat services the subject property is nonfunctional for five months each year between 
^ December and May. Accordingly, we believes that the value of the subject property should 
be reduced an amount equal to what it would cost to provided year-round water to the 
property. In the letter, he explained that an upgrade to the community water system costing 
at least flHHM^ould solve the problem. Although this cost would solve the water problem 
that exist for all homes in t h e ^ H H H H H B H M l B ' he believes the entire cost to cure 
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should be deducted from his property's value because the other residents are not interested in 
such a solution. 
We are hesitant to deduct the entire cost to cure the water problem fronmhe subject 
property's value. First, the water problem is apparently not so severe that the?Petitioners are 
unable to live in the subject during the five months each ye&r the system is nonfunctional. 
Second, we have received no evidence of what steps the Petitioners must take to rectify this 
problem each year so that, they can remain in the property. Third, thete is no evidence that 
the fair market value of the home is impacted by the entire cost to cure the subdivision's 
water problem. Fourth, there is no certainty ^ hat theFPetitioner would have to bear the entire 
cost to cure a problem that is borne by an entire subdivision. For these reasons, we reject the 
Petitioner's request to subtract H f l H | r o m ^ e va^ue °f the subject property. 
The only appraiser who addressed tfife subject's water problem was 
hisflHHHM appraisal. It was his opinion that the "sbasonal" water situation reduced the 
value of the subject property • • • • [ We consider hisflHHIMestimate the most 
convincing evidence submitted at the Initial Hearing concerning the reduction in value 
resulting from the water problem. 
Having earlier concluded that the value of the subject property would be 
before considering the water issue, a reduction offBHfc fr°m this value would result in a 
Ifair market value for the subject property. Based on all the evidence submitted, we 
find the fair market value of the subject property as of the lien date to be| 
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The Petitioners also contend that the subject property is assessed at a higher value 
than similar nearby homes. However, it is obvious that homes in the subject property's 
neighborhood vary significantly in size, quality of construction, age, and value. Much more 
information would be required to show that other homes assessed at lower values are so 
similar to the subject property that assessing the subject property at its fair market value 
would be inequitable. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Petitioners have provided evidence to convince the Commission that the 
subject property is entitled to the primary residential exemption for the 2001 tax year and orders 
the county to reinstate the exemption. In addition, based on the evidence submitted by all parties, 
the Commission finds the fair market value of the subject property to be f H H f l f a s Qf the lien 
date. It is so ordered. 
This decision does not limit a party's right toja Formal Hearing. However, this 
Decision and Order will become the Final Decision and Order of the Commission unless any party to 
this case files a written request within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision to proceed to a 
Formal Hearing. Such a request shall be mailed to the address listed below and rriust include the 
Petitioner's name, address, and appeal number: ; * 
Utah State Tax Commission 
' * Appeals Division 
210 North 1950 West \
 4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
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